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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model with housing, risky mortgages and endogenous
default. Housing investment is subject to idiosyncratic risk and some mortgages are
defaulted in equilibrium. An unanticipated increase in the standard deviation of hous-
ing investment produces a credit crunch where delinquencies and mortgage interest rates
increase, lending is curtailed, and aggregate demand for non-durable goods falls. The
economy experiences a recession as a consequence of the credit crunch. The paper com-
pares economies that differ only in the riskiness of housing investment. Economies with
lower risk are characterized by lower steady-state mortgage default rates and higher loan-
to-value and leverage ratios. The macroeconomic effects of an unanticipated increase in
housing investment risk are amplified in high-leverage economies. Monetary policy plays
an important role in the transmission of housing investment risk, as inertial interest rate
rules generate deeper output contractions.
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in August 2007 has its roots in increased mortgage delin-
quencies that put financial institutions into distress. The bursting of the housing bubble in the
United States placed many borrowers in a difficult financial position with mortgages they could
not pay in the long run and larger than the value of the houses against which they were under-
written. As a result the rate of seriously delinquent mortgages1 increased from 2% in the third
quarter of 2006 to 10% by the first quarter of 2010. Banks were forced to write down several
hundred billion dollars in bad mortgages. These losses combined with a high degree of opacity
surrounding mortgage-backed securities and a complicated web of interconnected obligations
among financial institutions triggered a severe liquidity crisis in the interbank market. A credit
crunch followed that caused failure of several financial institutions, brought many others close
to it, raised interbank rates and drastically reduced household access to borrowing. The fall in
housing prices and tightened credit conditions forced many borrowers to quickly de-leverage,
cut consumption and housing investment. The turmoil that started in the mortgage market
spread the rest of the economy to spark the Great Recession.
Several factors contributed to the depth and persistence of the recent recession. We focus on
one of these factors: the increase in mortgage delinquencies and its transmission to the rest of
the economy. Our goal is mainly methodological: we introduce endogenous default on mortgages
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing. Endogenous default
arise because housing investment is subject to idiosyncratic risk, which leads to mortgage default
once the loan repayment exceeds the housing value. The paper analyzes how aggregate shocks
affect the rate of default on mortgages and how an increase in the rate of default on mortgages
transmits to the rest of the economy. Driven by recent events, we focus on an unanticipated
increase in mortgage risk, which we model as an unanticipated increase in the volatility of
idiosyncratic housing investment risk.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses from a four-lag VAR with seriously delinquent mortgages
(DEL), real per capita consumption (CC), real per capita residential investment (IH), the four-
quarter change in the log of the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector (INFLY),
1According to the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Banker Association, seriously delinquent
mortgages are those more than 90 days past due or in foreclosure.
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real house prices (QQ) and the nominal short-term interest rate (RR) from 1980Q1 to 2006Q4.2
All data are for the United States. The starting date for our VAR is dictated by data availability
on mortgage delinquencies. On the other hand, we purposely limit our sample to 2006Q4 to
exclude the burst of the U.S. housing bubble and the sharp increase in delinquencies experienced
since the first quarter of 2007. Variables are listed in their Choleski ordering. Delinquencies are
ordered first because we allow for a shock in the mortgage market and mortgage delinquencies to
affect contemporaneously all other variables. Ordering delinquencies after the other variables,
and in particular after housing prices, does not change the qualitative responses to an innovation
to delinquencies, although standard errors become larger. As standard in the literature, we
order the nominal short-term interest rate last. All variables are de-trended using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.
The top part of Figure 1 illustrates the impulse responses of delinquencies, consumption, resi-
dential investment, inflation in non-durable goods, real housing prices and the nominal interest
rate to a one standard deviation innovation in serious delinquencies. It suggests a significant
short-run negative response of private consumption, residential investment, inflation, real house
prices and the nominal interest rate to a positive innovation to mortgage delinquencies. Res-
idential investment and house prices, the variables connected to the housing sector, fall on
impact and rebound after five quarters. The variables connected to the non-durable sector,
on the other hand, experience a more persistent decline, as private consumption and infla-
tion of non-durable goods remain below baseline for eight quarters. This evidence points to
a significant transmission mechanism of shocks from the mortgage market to the rest of the
economy.
The bottom part of Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of our six variables to a one stan-
dard deviation innovation in the nominal interest rate. An increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces consumption and residential investment. As already pointed out in the literature,3 the
output response in the durable sector, in our case residential investment, is stronger than in
the non-durable sector. Real house prices fall following an innovation to the nominal inter-
est rate, as consistent with the evidence in Iacoviello (2005). Mortgage delinquencies fall on
impact but increase soon afterward and remain above baseline for about six quarters. Mort-
2See Appendix A for data definition and sources.
3See Erceg and Levin (2006).
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Figure 1: VAR Evidence
Notes: VAR estimated from 1980Q1 to 2006Q4. The dashed lines indicate the +/- one standard error bands.
The Choleski ordering is DEL, CC, IH, INFLY, QQ and RRY. Vertical axis: percent deviation from baseline.
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gage delinquencies fall in response to an innovation in residential investment (not shown in
the paper but available in Appendix C.)4 Hence, mortgage delinquencies react significantly to
aggregate shocks. To sum up, the VAR evidence points to the fact that mortgage delinquencies
are an endogenous variable that affects and is affected by other fundamental macroeconomic
variables. Our goal is to build a general equilibrium macroeconomic model that captures these
relationships.
Our model features two households that differ in terms of their discount factor. Savers have a
higher discount factor than Borrowers and, in equilibrium, lend to Borrowers. Preferences are
specified over consumption of non-durable goods, housing services and hours worked. Borrowers
use their houses as collateral for mortgages and experience idiosyncratic housing investment
shocks that can only be observed by the household itself. Lenders must pay a monitoring cost
to observe Borrower’s realized housing return. Borrowers experiencing low realizations of the
idiosyncratic shock default on their mortgages; Borrowers who repay their mortgages pay a
state-contingent adjustable mortgage rate that is above the risk-free one. Hence, our model
is characterized by endogenous default on mortgages and a mortgage, or external finance,
premium.
We study the dynamic response to an unanticipated increase in the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic risk to housing investment, which we also refer to as mortgage risk. More precisely,
we assume that the standard deviation of mortgage risk follows an exogenous stochastic process
and we analyze the dynamic response of our model following a positive shock to such standard
deviation. This assumption captures the idea that housing investment risk is time-variant and
that the entrance in the mortgage market of sub-prime debtors may have increased such risk.
Our model produces a credit crunch that generates a recession not only in the housing sector but
also in the non-durable one. Mortgage default rates as well as the mortgage premium, namely
the spread between the adjustable mortgage rate and the risk-free rate, increase. Households
with mortgages are particularly hurt. Borrowers experience a deterioration of their financial
situation and tighter credit conditions, which force them to de-leverage and cut non-durable
consumption and housing investment. Aggregate non-durable consumption and total output
fall. The relative price of houses falls and then rapidly rebounds. An increase in mortgage risk
generates a recession but it fails to generate a large and persistent fall and a decline, although
4Appendix C is available on the corresponding author’s website at http://cfi.epfl.ch/cms/page-40442.html
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short-lived, in housing prices.
We consider two economies that differ only in mortgage risk. The economy with lower steady-
state standard deviation of mortgage risk has a lower steady-state rate of default on mortgages.
As a result, mortgages are larger and the economy is more leveraged. Economies with higher
leverage ratios display more redistribution and more polarized responses to aggregate shocks, as
the two households stand at the opposite sides of the mortgage contract. When mortgage risk
increases, Borrowers are hurt more and the effects of the credit crunch are amplified. Hence,
more leveraged economies suffer deeper recessions.
We analyze the dynamic response to an increase in mortgage risk under alternative specifi-
cations of the interest rate rule that governs monetary policy. More inertial rules feature less
aggressive interest rate reductions in response to a mortgage risk shock that ultimately lead to
deeper output contractions in the non-durable sector and in the economy. Non-inertial interest
rate rules, on the other hand, generate large negative interest rate responses that boost Savers’
non-durable consumption and are successfully smooth out the contraction in the non-durable
sector. Hence, interest rate flexibility is important in responding to a mortgage risk shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
section 3 presents the model. Section 4 presents two calibrations, benchmark and low-leverage,
and analyzes the difference in the steady state of the two economies. Section 5 analyzes the
transmission mechanism in response to a mortgage risk shock in the benchmark economy, the
low-leverage economy, and it analyzes the role of interest rate flexibility. Section 6 analyzes the
dynamic response of the model to a monetary shock. Section 7 summarizes and suggests future
directions for research.
2 Related Literature
A growing literature embeds durable goods in DSGE models. A strand of this literature adds
durable goods to an otherwise standard sticky-price model. Barsky, House and Kimball (2007)
show that the pricing of durable goods plays a key role in the behavior of the model. More
precisely, if prices of durable goods are sticky, the model behaves as if most prices are sticky.
On the other hand, if prices of durable goods are flexible, the model behaves as if most prices
are flexible. When durable prices are flexible, the durable goods sector shrinks in response
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to a monetary expansion, thereby offsetting the expansion in the non-durable goods sector
and leaving GDP unchanged. Using VAR evidence Erceg and Levin (2006) document positive
sectorial co-movement as well as higher sensitivity of the durable good sector to the nominal
interest rate in response to a monetary shock. To match this empirical evidence with the
model impulse responses, Erceg and Levin (2006) assume wage stickiness and the same degree
of price stickiness in the durable and non-durable sector. They then analyze the consequences
of this asymmetry for optimal monetary policy and show that social welfare depends on the
variances of sectoral output gaps and on the dispersion of prices and wages in each sector.
The optimal monetary policy is well approximated by a simple rule that targets a weighted
average of wage and price inflation. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) underline the existence of a
co-movement puzzle following a monetary policy shock since negative sectorial co-movement as
well as a high degree price of stickiness in the durable sector are both counterfactual. They
suggest to introduce sticky wages and adjustment costs in the durable sector to bring the model
predictions closer to the empirical findings.
A second groups of contributions incorporates financial frictions a´ la Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) into a model with housing as a durable good, sticky prices, and two households with
different discount factors. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, Iacoviello (2005) features
an exogenous borrowing constraint according to which impatient agents can borrow a fraction
of the expected discounted future value of their houses. He shows how introducing housing as a
collateral generates a financial accelerator in response to demand shocks and helps reconciling
the VAR evidence with the impulse responses of the model. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) extend
the work of Iacoviello (2005) and write a DSGE model with housing that is estimated using
U.S. data for the period 1965Q1 to 2006Q3. Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2009) analyze how
the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks in a housing model a´ la Iacoviello is affected by
alternative values of the down-payment rate and the interest rate mortgage structure. Monacelli
(2009) shows that a model where housing is used as collateral features co-movement in response
to a monetary shock provided the durable sector display some degree of price stickiness.
Our housing model draws a number of features from these contributions. As in Iacoviello
(2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we build a model with two household groups and housing
as a durable good. However in our model loans are never fully repaid. The novelty of our paper
is in fact to introduce idiosyncratic risk in housing investment and the possibility for loans
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to be defaulted on, which results in an endogenous borrowing constraint similar to that for
entrepreneurs in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
The literature on the financial accelerator is vast. Starting with Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
and Bernanke et al. (1999), many papers have introduced this credit friction in DSGE models
to analyze its role on the transmission of shocks. We do not present an exhaustive review of
the financial accelerator literature here but rather focus on some recent applications that are
closer to our study. Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004) model risk-neutral homeowners that
buy houses and rent them to a representative household. The homeowners’ problem is akin to
that of entrepreneurs in Bernanke et al. (1999). Households are either consumption smoothers
or rule-of-thumb consumers who consume their labor income and transfers from homeowners.
Aoki et al. (2004) analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks when transactions costs for
borrowing against housing equity fall.
In our model mortgage default and the associated loss of housing stock affect risk averse,
borrowing-constrained consumers rather than risk-neutral homeowners, so that the transmission
mechanism is different. Moreover, our focus is on an unanticipated increase in idiosyncratic
mortgage risk and its effects on the macro-economy.
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009) augment a standard monetary DSGE model to include
financial markets and a financial accelerator and fit the model to European and U.S. data. They
analyze an increase in the standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk in loans to entrepreneurs.
In our setting, idiosyncratic risk is in mortgage loans. Cohen-Cole and Martinez-Garcia (2008)
consider a model with a financial accelerator as in Bernanke et al. (1999) and introduce systemic
risk, namely an aggregate variable that affects the variance of idiosyncratic risk, and banking
regulation. Similarly, Faia and Monacelli (2007) consider systemic risk as a correlation between
the mean of the idiosyncratic risk and the aggregate shock . We do not consider systemic
risk but allow for time variation in the standard deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic
housing investment risk.
Some recent papers examine the effects of different types of shocks to loan repayment. Dellas,
Diba and Loisel (2010) add a banking sector to an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model
and consider some financial shocks, among them an increase in the exogenous rate of default
of firms on bank loans. They argue that price stability is all that matter for monetary policy,
even when financial factors are present. Our work differs from Dellas et al. (2010) in a number
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of ways. Our model features a housing sector but no financial sector; moreover, default on
loans is endogenous in our model while it is exogenous in Dellas et al. (2010). Iacoviello (2010)
introduces the banking sector in a model with housing and studies an exogenous shock to how
much borrowers repay. This repayment shock is exogenous and different from default because
borrowers do not lose their houses following a negative repayment shock.
3 The Model
Our starting point is a model with patient and impatient households that consume non-durable
goods and housing service and work. Many features of our model draw from the housing model
of Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Monacelli (2009). Our focus, however, is
on the mortgage contract and on how its features matter for the transmission of shocks. We
do not rely on an exogenous borrowing constraint but rather derive it endogenously from the
lenders’ participation constraint after explicitly introducing idiosyncratic risk and default.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households distributed over the [0, 1] interval.
A fraction ψ of identical households has discount factor β while the remaining fraction 1 − ψ
has discount factor γ > β. We are going to refer to the households with the lower discount
factor as Borrowers, as these households value current consumption relatively more than the
other agents and therefore want to borrow. We are going to refer to households with the higher
discount factor as Savers.
Borrowers
Borrowers have a lifetime utility function given by
max
∞∑
t=0
βtE0 {U (Xt, NC,t, NH,t)} , 0 < β < 1 (1)
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where NC,t is hours worked in the non-durable sector, NH,t is hours worked in the housing
sector, and Xt is an index of non-durable and durable consumption services defined as
Xt ≡
[
(1− α) 1ηCt
η−1
η + α
1
ηHt+1
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (2)
where Ct denotes consumption of non-durable goods, Ht denotes consumption of housing ser-
vices, α is the share of housing in the consumption index and η ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substi-
tution between housing and non-durable services. We assume that housing services in period
t are equal to the housing stock chosen at the beginning of period t, Ht+1. Assuming that
services are a fraction of the stock is not going to change qualitatively our results.
We assume the following utility function:
U(Xt, Nt) ≡ lnXt − ν
1 + ϕ
[
N1+ξC,t +N
1+ξ
H,t
] 1+ϕ
1+ξ
, ϕ, ξ ≥ 0. (3)
Our specification for the disutility of labor follows Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in allowing that
hours in the non-durable and housing sector are imperfect substitutes, as consistent with the
evidence found by Horvath (2000). For ξ = 0 hours in the non-durable and housing sector are
perfect substitutes. On the other hand, positive values of ξ result in wages not being equalized
in the two sectors and the substitution of hours across sectors in response to wage differentials
being reduced. The parameter ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Borrowers are subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
PC,tCt + PH,tHt+1 + [1− Ft(ω¯t)](1 +RZ,t)Lt = Lt+1 +WC,tNC,t +WH,tNH,t+
(1− δ) [1−Gt(ω¯t)]PH,tHt, (4)
where PC,t is the price of non-durable goods, PH,t is the price of housing, Lt+1 are the loans
taken from Savers at t to be repaid in period t + 1. RZ,t is the state-contingent interest rate
that non-defaulting Borrowers pay at t on the loans Lt taken at time t − 1 and Wj,t is the
nominal wage in sector j = C,H. In equilibrium some loans are going to be defaulted on.
The term [1 − Gt(ω¯t)] represents Borrowers’ housing stock at the end of period t and after a
fraction of the loans has been defaulted on; [1−Ft(ω¯t)] is the fraction of loans that is repaid to
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lenders. We explicitly derive and explain these two terms later. The housing stock depreciates
at the rate δ. Each household decides non-durable good consumption, housing investment (and
consumption), working hours in the two sectors and loans.
It is worth noticing at this point that the state-contingent interest rate RZ,t is determined
at time t after the realization of shocks and in order to satisfy the participation constraint of
lenders, which we explain in detail later. Hence, our mortgage contract is characterized by
adjustable interest rates.
Each household consists of many members. The household decides total housing investment
Ht+1, the state-contingent mortgage rates to be paid next period on the contracts signed this
period, and then assigns equal resources to each i-th member to purchase the housing stock
H it+1, where
∫
i
H it+1di = Ht+1. The i−th member finalizes the mortgage contract connected to
the housing stock H it+1 following the instructions of the household and manages his housing
stock. All members are ex-ante identical. After the mortgage contract is finalized, the i-th
household member experiences an idiosyncratic shock ωit+1 such that his ex-post housing value
is ωit+1PH,t+1H
i
t+1. This assumption captures the idea that housing investment is risky. An
alternative interpretation is that housing prices are subject to idiosyncratic risk so that the ex-
post price of the housing stock i is equal to ωit+1PH,t+1. This price risk could capture the fact that
housing prices display geographical variation. The random variable ωit+1 is i.i.d. across members
of the same household and log-normally distributed with a cumulative distribution function
Ft+1(ω
i
t+1), which obeys standard regularity conditions.
5 The mean and variance of lnωit+1 are
chosen so that Et(ω
i
t+1) = 1 at all times. This implies that while there is idiosyncratic risk at
the household-member level, there is no risk at the household level and Et(ω
i
t+1H
i
t+1) = Ht+1.
We are going to assume that housing investment riskiness can change over time, namely that
the standard deviation σω,t of lnωt is subject to an exogenous shock and displays time variation.
The random variable ωit+1 is observed by the i−th member and the household but can only be
observed by lenders after paying a monitoring cost.
After idiosyncratic shocks are realized, the household member decides whether to repay his
5The c.d.f. is continuous, at least once-differentiable, and it satisfies
∂ωh(ω)
∂ω
> 0,
where h(ω) is the hazard rate.
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mortgage or to default. Loans connected to housing stocks that experienced high realizations
of the idiosyncratic shock ωit+1 are repaid, while loans connected to housing stocks with low
realizations are defaulted on. Let ω¯t+1 be the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock for
which the member is willing to repay the loan at the contractual rate RZ,t+1, namely
ω¯t+1(1− δ)PH,t+1Ht+1 = (1 +RZ,t+1)Lt+1. (5)
Loans connected to ωit+1 ∈ [ω¯t+1,∞] are repaid and Borrowers pay (1 + RZ,t+1)Lt+1. On the
other hand, loans connected to ωit+1 ∈ [0, ω¯t+1] are defaulted. Lenders pay a monitoring cost to
assess and seize the collateral connected to the defaulted loan. It is the presence of monitoring
that induces Borrowers to truthfully reveal their idiosyncratic shock and justifies the incentive
compatibility constraint (5).6 The household members that default on their mortgages lose
their housing stocks.
Mortgages are nonrecourse in our model, that is to say mortgages are secured by the pledge of
collateral (the house) and the lender’s recovery is strictly limited to the collateral. Defaulting
Borrowers are not personally liable for the difference between the loan and the collateral value.
Some comments are in order. This is a natural assumption in our model because housing is
the only asset held by Borrowers. In addition to this, nonrecourse debt is broadly applicable
to most U.S. states, especially those that experienced soaring mortgage delinquencies, and the
focus of our paper is on the United States. At last, nonrecourse debt captures the reality of
subprime mortgages, which were at the heart of the recent financial crisis.
In Bernanke et al. (1999) the monitoring cost is equal to a fraction of the realized gross
payoff to the defaulting firm’s capital. We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) and assume that the
monitoring cost in our model is equal to the fraction µ of the housing value, µωit+1PH,tHt+1.
This assumption has two important implications. The first implication is that the foreclosure
process has a cost for lenders that is proportional to the value of the house under foreclosure.
The second implication is that mortgage default and the subsequent foreclosure process cause
a decline in the housing stock and thereby on housing services. The second implication plays
an important role in our results. We discuss its relevance as well as alternative assumption for
monitoring costs in the concluding section.
6See the seminal work of Townsend (1979).
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Regarding the defaulting household members, we follow the literature on matching and assume
there is perfect insurance among household members so that consumption of non-durable goods
and housing services are ex-post equal across all members of the Borrower household. Hence,
Borrower household members are ex-post identical.
Following Bernanke et al. (1999) we consider a one-period mortgage contract that guarantees
lenders a pre-determined rate of return on their total loans. At time t Savers make total loans
Lt+1 to Borrowers and demand the gross rate of return 1 + RL,t. This rate of return is pre-
determined at t and non-state contingent. Hence, the time t participation constraint of lenders
is given by:
(1+RL,t)Lt+1 =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1(1−µ)(1−δ)PH,t+1Ht+1ft+1(ω)dω+
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
(1+RZ,t+1)Lt+1ft+1(ω)dω,
(6)
where ft(ω) is the probability density function of ω, which is time variant because it is subject
to an exogenous shock to its standard deviation. The return on total loans is equal to the
housing stock net of monitoring costs and depreciation of defaulting Borrower members (the
first term on the right-hand side of (6)) and the repayment of non-defaulting members (the
second term on the right-hand side of (6)). After idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks have
realized, the threshold value ω¯t+1 and the state-contingent mortgage rate RZ,t+1 are determined
so as to satisfy the participation constraint above. Notice that the participation constraint
holds state-by-state and not in expected terms. In other words, an aggregate state that raises
ω¯t+1 and the rate of default on mortgages generates an increase in the adjustable rate RZ,t+1
paid by non-defaulting members in order to satisfy the participation constraint (6) in that state.
This implies that periods characterized by rising mortgage default rates are also accompanied
by rising mortgage interest rates in our model.
We use one-period debt contracts as in Bernanke et al. (1999) for tractability reasons. In
reality, conventional U.S. mortgages typically have a fixed 30-year term and about 70% of
mortgages have fixed rates, even though this percentage has changed in recent years. Moreover,
subprime mortgages with nontraditional ARM features were at the heart of the recent crisis.
Our model does not consider these alternative mortgage instruments and therefore cannot
capture their role at the onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, our general equilibrium model captures
the effect of a fall in housing prices on mortgage default rates and its transmission to the other
13
sector of the economy.
We simplify the Borrower problem as follows. Let
Gt+1(ω¯t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1ft+1(ω)dω (7)
be the expected value of the idiosyncratic shock conditional on the shock being less than or
equal to the threshold value ω¯t+1 and let
Γt+1(ω¯t+1) ≡ ω¯t+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ft+1(ω)dω +Gt+1(ω¯t+1) (8)
be the expected share of housing value, gross of monitoring costs, that goes to lenders. Then
the participation constraint can be written more compactly as
(1 +RL,t)lt+1 = [Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)] (1− δ)pH,t+1piC,t+1Ht+1, (9)
where pH,t+1 is the relative price of houses in terms of non-durable consumption and lt+1 are
real loans, namely Lt+1/PC,t. The loan-to-value ratio at t is
Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1), (10)
and it measures the size of the loan (principal plus interests) as a fraction of the net housing
value. The loan-to-value ratio also measures the net share of the housing value that goes to the
lender for repayment.
Following the decision to default at time t, Borrowers are left with the following stock of
housing:
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωt+1(1− δ)PH,tHt+1ft+1(ω)dω = [1−Gt+1(ω¯t+1)] (1− δ)PH,tHt+1, (11)
where the second equality makes use of the fact that Et(ωt+1) = 1. This is the expression used
in the Borrowers budget constraint (4).
Using the relationship between ω¯t+1 and RZ,t+1 in (5) we can eliminate RZ,t from the Borrower
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budget constraint and rewrite it in real terms as
Ct+pH,tHt+1 +(1+RL,t−1)
lt
piC,t
= lt+1 +(1−δ) [1− µGt(ω¯t)] pH,tHt+wC,tNC,t+wH,tNH,t, (12)
where piC,t is non-durable-good inflation and wC,t, wH,t are real wages in the C and H sector,
respectively, in terms of PC,t. Borrowers maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint (12)
and the participation constraint (9) with respect to the variables Ct, Ht+1, NC,t, NH,t, lt+1, ω¯t+1.
The respective first-order conditions are:
UC,t − λBC,t = 0, (13)
UH,t+1 − λBC,tpH,t + β(1− δ)Et {[1− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)] pH,t+1λBC,t+1+ (14)
λPC,t+1pH,t+1piC,t+1 [Γt(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)]} = 0,
UNj ,t + λBC,twj,t = 0, j ∈ [C,H], (15)
λBC,t − (1 +RL,t)Et
[
λPC,t+1 + β
λBC,t+1
piC,t+1
]
= 0, (16)
−βλBC,t+1µG′t+1(ω¯t+1) + λPC,t+1piC,t+1
[
Γ
′
t+1(ω¯t+1)− µG
′
t+1(ω¯t+1)
]
= 0, (17)
where λBC,t is the Lagrangian multiplier on Borrowers budget constraint (12) and λPC,t+1 is the
Lagrangian multiplier on the participation constraint (9). Notice that the first-order condition
with respect to ω¯t+1 is state-by-state and not in expected terms.
Savers
We denote Savers’ variables with a ˜, except for loans. Savers maximize lifetime utility
max
∞∑
t=0
γtE0
{
U(X˜t, N˜C,t, N˜H,t)
}
, 0 < β < γ < 1 (18)
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where X˜t is defined similarly to (2). We assume for Savers the same utility function as for
Borrowers. Savers maximize lifetime utility subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
C˜t + pH,tH˜t+1 + l˜t+1 = (1− δ)pH,tH˜t + (1 +RL,t−1) l˜t
piC,t
+ wC,tN˜C,t + wH,tN˜H,t + ∆˜t, (19)
where ∆˜t are profits in the intermediate goods sector, which are taken as given.
Savers maximize (18) subject to the budget constraint (19) with respect to C˜t, H˜t+1, N˜C,t, N˜H,t
and l˜t+1. The first-order conditions, respectively, are
UC˜,t − λ˜BC,t = 0, (20)
UH˜,t+1 − λ˜BC,tpH,t + γ(1− δ)Et
[
λ˜BC,t+1pH,t+1
]
= 0, (21)
UN˜j ,t + λ˜BC,twj,t = 0, j ∈ [C,H], (22)
−λ˜BC,t + γ(1 +RL,t)Et
[
λ˜BC,t+1
piC,t+1
]
= 0, (23)
where λ˜BC,t is the Lagrangian multiplier on Savers budget constraint (19).
3.2 Firms and Technology
Both the non-durable C and the housing H sector have intermediate and final good producers.
Final Good Producers
Final good producers are perfectly competitive and produce Yj,t, j = C,H. The technology in
the j−th final good sector is given by
Yj,t =
(∫ 1
0
Yj,t(i)
εj−1
εj di
) εj
εj−1
, (24)
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where εj > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods in sector j. Standard
profit maximization implies that the demand for intermediate good i is given by
Yj,t(i) =
(
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t
)−εj
Yj,t, ∀i (25)
where the price index is
Pj,t =
(∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)
1−εjdi
) 1
1−εj
.
Intermediate Good Sectors
There are two intermediate good sectors j ∈ [C,H] and in each intermediate sector there is a
continuum of firms, each producing a differentiated good i ∈ [0, 1]. These firms are monopo-
listically competitive. We assume that intermediate good firms readjust their price according
to a Calvo-type mechanism. Hence, in any given period, a firm in sector j may reset its price
with probability 1− θj.
Intermediate good firm i produces according to the following production function
Yj,t(i) = Aj,t
[
ζ
1
ςNj,t(i)
ς−1
ς + (1− ζ) 1ς N˜j,t(i) ς−1ς
] ς
ς−1
, j ∈ C,H (26)
where Aj,t is the stochastic level of technology in sector j and Nj,t(i) and N˜j,t(i) are the two
labor types supplied respectively by Borrowers and Savers. ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the labor share of
Borrowers in the production function and ς > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across labor
inputs. When ς → ∞, labor inputs become perfect substitutes. For simplicity these two
parameters are assumed to be equal across sectors.
A firm i re-optimizing in period t chooses labor and its nominal price P ∗j,t(i) so as to maximize
the expected discount sum of nominal profits over the period during which its price remains
unchanged. Thus, the maximization problem for firm i is given by
max
P ∗j,t(i),Nj,t+k|t(i),N˜j,t+k|t(i)
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
θkjΛt,t+k
[
P ∗j,t(i)Yj,t+k|t(i)−Wj,t+kNj,t+k|t(i)− W˜j,t+kN˜j,t+k|t(i)
(27)
+mcj,t+k|t(i)Pj,t+k
[
Aj,t+k
[
ζ
1
ςNj,t+k|t(i)
ς−1
ς + (1− ζ) 1ς N˜j,t+k|t(i) ς−1ς
] ς
ς−1 − Yj,t+k|t(i)
]]}
,
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where Yj,t+k|t(i) denotes output in period t+ k for a firm i that last changed its price in period
t. A similar interpretation applies to Nj,t+k|t(i) and N˜j,t+k|t(i). mcj,t+k|t(i) is the real marginal
cost of a firm i that last changed its price in period t.
In (27) the demand and the stochastic discount are respectively given by
Yj,t+k|t(i) =
(
P ∗j,t(i)
Pj,t+k
)−εj
Yj,t+k, Λt,t+k ≡ γ
kλ˜BC,t+k
λ˜BC,t
.
The first-order condition relative to is Nj,t+k|t(i) and N˜j,t+k|t(i) are
−Wj,t+k +mcj,t+k|t(i)Pj,t+kYj,t+k|t(i)− 1ς ζ 1ςNj,t+k|t(i)− 1ς = 0, (28)
−W˜j,t+k +mcj,t+k|t(i)Pj,t+kYj,t+k|t(i)− 1ς (1− ζ)
1
ς N˜j,t+k|t(i)−
1
ς = 0, (29)
which state that the nominal marginal cost equals the ratio of the nominal wage to the marginal
product of each type of labor input. By rearranging (28) and (29) we obtain:
mcj,t+k|t(i) =
1
Aj,t+kPj,t+k
[
ζW 1−ςj,t+k + (1− ζ)W˜ 1−ςj,t+k
] 1
1−ς
. (30)
According to (30), mcj,t+k|t(i) = mcj,t+k. Marginal costs are equal across firms because wages
are the same across all firms.
The first-order condition relative to the price is given by
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
θkjΛt,t+k
[(
P ∗j,t(i)
Pj,t+k
)(−εj−1)
Yj,t+k
(
P ∗j,t(i)
Pj,t+k
− ε
ε− 1mct+k
)]}
= 0. (31)
Finally, it can be shown7 that, under Calvo price setting, the optimal price set by re-optimizing
firms is linked to the aggregate price behavior by the following condition:
(
P ∗j,t
Pj,t
)(1−ε)
=
1− θjpiε−1j,t
1− θj , (32)
where pij,t denotes gross inflation in sector j prices.
7For a formal proof see for instance Woodford (2003).
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3.3 Monetary Policy
We assume that monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule for the nominal interest rate:
1 +RL,t
1 +RL
= AM,t
[
piφpiC,t
]1−φr [1 +RL,t−1
1 +RL
]φr
, φpi > 1, φr < 1, (33)
where RL is the steady-state nominal interest rate, φpi is the coefficient on the inflation target,
φr is the coefficient on the lagged interest rate, and AM,t is a monetary policy shock. In our
benchmark calibration monetary policy targets inflation in the non-durable goods sector and
implements interest-rate smoothing.
3.4 Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the non-durable goods market requires that production of the final non-durable
good equals aggregate demand:
YC,t = ψCt + (1− ψ)C˜t. (34)
Similarly, equilibrium in the housing market requires
YH,t = ψ {Ht+1 − (1− δ) [1− µGt(ω¯t)]Ht}+ (1− ψ)
[
H˜t+1 − (1− δ)H˜t
]
. (35)
Output in the housing sector net of monitoring costs is equal to
Y NH,t = YH,t − ψµ(1− δ)Gt(ω¯t)Ht. (36)
Equilibrium in the labor market requires
∫ 1
0
LC,t(i)di = ψNC,t + (1− ψ)N˜C,t, (37)
∫ 1
0
LH,t(i)di = ψNH,t + (1− ψ)N˜H,t, (38)
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while the equilibrium in the credit market requires
ψlt = (1− ψ)l˜t. (39)
We define total output as
Yt = YC,t + ph,tYH,t. (40)
Notice that our measurement of total output reflects variations in the relative price of housing.
National account statistics, on the other hand, measure GDP at constant relative prices.
3.5 Exogenous Shocks
There are five exogenous shocks in our model. Aggregate productivity in the two sectors and
the monetary policy shock evolve according to the following first-order autoregressive processes
lnAC,t = ρC lnAC,t−1 + C,t, ρC ∈ (−1, 1), (41)
lnAH,t = ρH lnAH,t−1 + H,t, ρH ∈ (−1, 1), (42)
lnAM,t = ρM lnAM,t−1 + M,t, ρM ∈ (−1, 1), (43)
where C , H , M are i.i.d. innovations with mean zero and standard deviation σC , σH , σM , re-
spectively, and ρC , ρH , ρM are persistence parameters.
As for the idiosyncratic risk in the housing sector, we follow Bernanke et al. (1999) and assume
that ωt is distributed log-normally:
lnωt ∼ N(−
σ2ω,t
2
, σ2ω,t). (44)
As stated earlier, the mean of the distribution is chosen so that Et(ωt+1) = 1. We are going
to analyze the case where the standard deviation of idiosyncratic housing investment risk ex-
ogenously increases. To do this, we assume that the standard deviation of lnωt is itself an
exogenous shock subject to a first-order autoregressive process:
ln
σω,t
σω
= ρσ ln
σω,t−1
σω
+ σω,t , (45)
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where σω,t is an i.i.d. shock with mean zero and finite standard deviation σσω and ρσ is the
serial correlation coefficient. This assumption captures the fact that housing investment is risky
and this risk can change exogenously over time.
Private agents know these exogenous processes and use them to form correct expectations.
4 Steady-State Analysis
4.1 Benchmark Calibration
The parameters values for our benchmark calibration are specified in Table 1. We follow
Monacelli (2009) in choosing the values for the discount factors for Borrowers and Savers, the
rate of depreciation for housing and the elasticity of substitution between non-durable goods
and housing services. The Saver’s discount factor γ is set equal to 0.99 and Borrower’s β is
set equal to 0.98. We choose an annual depreciation rate for housing of 4 percentage points,
implying δ = 0.01. The elasticity of substitution between non-durable consumption and housing
is η = 1, which implies a Cobb-Douglas specification for the composite consumption index Xt.
U.S. private fixed investment in structures, residential and nonresidential, has been on average
5 percent of GDP from 1960 to 2009, while during the period 2000 to 2007 it averaged 8 percent
of GDP. We set the parameter α that measures the share of housing in the consumption bundle
equal to 0.16 so that the housing sector represents 8 percent of total output at the steady
state. The Saver discount factor pins down the steady-state interest rate at RL = 0.0101 on
a quarterly basis. This implies an annual interest rate equal of 4.1 percentage points. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ is set equal to one, as in Barsky et al. (2007)
and as typical in the macro literature. As for the parameter ξ that measures the degree of
substitutability between hours worked in the two sectors, we set it equal to 0.871. This is the
appropriate weighted average of the ξ for Borrowers and Savers estimated by Iacoviello and
Neri (2010).
For the degree of price stickiness, we assume that housing prices are fully flexible and set
θH = 0, which is in line with the empirical estimation of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and the
empirical evidence on price stickiness for durable goods. For non-durable goods, θC is set equal
to 0.67 to imply that firms in the non-durable sector change their prices on average every nine
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Parameter Value Description
γ 0.99 Discount factor of Savers
β 0.98 Discount factor of Borrowers
ψ 0.5 Relative size of Borrower group
δ 0.01 Rate of depreciation for housing
εC 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for C goods
εH 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for H goods
ς 3 Elasticity of substitution across labor inputs
ζ 0.5 Share of Borrower labor in the production function
ξ 0.871 Elasticity of substitution across labor types
α 0.16 Share of housing in consumption bundle
ν 2.5 Disutility from work
η 1 Elasticity of substitution between C and H goods
ϕ 1 Inverse of elasticity of labor supply
θC 0.67 Calvo probability in C
θH 0 Calvo probability in H
φpi 1.5 Taylor-rule coefficient on inflation
φr 0.9 Taylor-rule coefficient on past nominal interest rate
ρC 0.9 Serial correlation of productivity shocks in C
ρH 0.9 Serial correlation of productivity shocks in H
ρM 0 Serial correlation of monetary policy shocks
σω 0.20 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks
µ 0.12 Monitoring cost
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
months. For monetary policy, we set φpi = 1.5 and φr = 0.9, which are standard values in the
literature. The serial correlation of the monetary policy shock is ρM = 0. We assume that the
Borrower and Saver groups have equal size so that ψ = 0.5.
For technology, we follow Calza et al. (2009) and set the elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods εj equal to 7.5 in each sector. Labor inputs are imperfect substitutes in
production and the elasticity of substitution across Borrower’s and Saver’s labor is ς = 3. We
also assume that the share of Borrower’s labor in the production function ζ is equal to 0.5. The
serial correlation of the productivity shocks in the non-durable and housing sectors are chosen
to be ρC = 0.9 and ρH = 0.9, respectively.
Table 2 reports the steady-state values for the benchmark calibration. The loan-to-value ratio
is defined in equation (10) and the leverage ratio for Borrowers at the steady state is calculated
as
Leverage Ratio =
l
l + wCNc + wHNH
,
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which measures the fraction of total expenses financed by loans, namely consumption of C and
H plus loan repayment over loans. The leverage ratio captures the dependence of Borrowers
from external funding.
We choose the standard deviation of the distribution of lnω at the steady state to match the
pre-crisis delinquency rates for prime loans. In the fourth quarter of 2006 seriously delinquent
mortgages represented 2.21 percentage points of all mortgages.8 We set σω = 0.2 and obtain
an annual default rate of 2.34 percentage points. As for the shocks that raise the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic housing investment risk, we believe they are persistent but there
is no previous work we can rely on. Christiano et al. (2009) estimate the persistence of the
idiosyncratic productivity shock for the United States to be 0.85. We set ρσ = 0.9. The median
foreclosure price for single-family residencies, condominiums, and townhouses in California in
the first half of 2006 was 12% lower than the median market price of homes sold within the same
area without having been previously foreclosed – see Cagan (2006). Hence, we set µ = 0.12 and
monitoring costs are 12% of the housing value. Interestingly, this is also the value for monitoring
cost in Bernanke et al. (1999). At the steady state, the loan-to-value ratio in our benchmark
calibration is almost 60 percentage points. This is lower than 75.7 percentage points, which
is the average U.S. loan-to-value ratio between 1973 and 2008. We can raise the steady-state
loan-to-value ratio by reducing σω, the steady-state riskiness of loans; however this is going to
reduce the steady-state rate of default. For this reason, we prefer to match the delinquency
rate but have a lower loan-to-value ratio than suggested by the data.
At the steady state, the quarterly mortgage rate rate paid by non-defaulting Borrowers is
RZ = 0.0111, which corresponds to an annual rate of 4.51 percentage points. We define the
external finance premium at t as RZ,t −RL,t, namely the difference between the ex-post state-
contingent rate paid by non-defaulting household members and the risk-free interest rate, which
in our setting is equivalent to the pre-determined rate received by lenders on aggregate loans.9
This premium captures the additional cost that Borrowers must pay for their risky mortgages
relative to risk-free borrowing. At the steady state, the external finance premium is equal
to 0.41 percentage points on an annual basis. We calculate the empirical counterpart to our
8See the National Delinquency Survey conducted by the Mortgage Bankers Association.
9Our definition of external finance premium differs from that in Bernanke et al. (1999), where the premium
is the difference between the costs of funds raised externally and the opportunity costs of funds internal to the
firm.
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Variable
Consumption, Borrowers* 44.28
Housing Demand, Borrowers* 39.40
Hours Worked in C Sector, Borrowers* 54.30
Hours Worked in H Sector, Borrowers* 54.30
ph Output H/Total Output 8.09
Loans 2.1747
Loan-to-Value Ratio 59.17
Leverage Ratio 80.12
Default Rate on Mortgages† 2.34
External Finance Premium† 0.41
Mortgage Interest Rate† 4.51
* Expressed as percentage of aggregate level, e.g. Consumption, Borrowers = ψC/(ψC + (1− ψ)C˜).
†Annual, percentage points.
Note: The Leverage Ratio is calculated as l/(l + wCNc + wHNH).
Table 2: Steady State under the Benchmark Calibration
external finance premium as the difference between the 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate10
and the interest rate on the U.S. Treasury 30-Year bonds.11 The average difference between
these two annual interest rates between 1977 and 2009 was 1.5 percentage points. This makes
the finance premium of our benchmark model one percentage point lower than its empirical
counterpart.
For our dynamic analysis, we log-linearize around the deterministic steady state. We solve
the resulting linear system of rational expectation equations using the standard techniques.
4.2 Low-Leverage Calibration
We additionally consider an economy characterized by higher idiosyncratic housing investment
risk but otherwise identical to the benchmark economy described above. For this economy the
steady-state standard deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic housing investment risk is
set to σω = 0.6. All the other parameters are as in Table 1. Higher idiosyncratic housing
investment risk implies that more household members are in the left tail of the distribution and
that the steady-state rate of default is higher. This raises the external finance premium and
reduces mortgage loans, the loan-to-value ratio and leverage ratio relative to the benchmark
10See the H-15 Release of the Federal Reserve Economic Data.
11See the Economic Report to the President, Table B73.
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Variable Benchmark Low Leverage % Difference
Output C 0.5407 0.5399 0.15
Output H 0.1465 0.1419 3.24
Consumption, Borrowers 0.4789 0.4887 -2.01
Consumption, Savers 0.6026 0.5912 1.93
Housing Demand, Borrowers 11.5421 10.5337 9.57
Housing Demand, Savers 17.7524 17.8431 -0.51
Hours Worked, Borrowers in C Sector 0.5879 0.5789 1.55
Hours Worked, Borrowers in H Sector 0.1617 0.1549 4.41
Hours Worked, Savers in C Sector 0.4948 0.5019 -1.41
Hours Worked, Savers in H Sector 0.1361 0.1343 1.37
Loans 2.1747 0.7980 172.54
Loan-to-Value Ratio* 59.17 24.37 142.80
Leverage Ratio* 80.12 60.01 33.51
Default Rate on Mortgages† 2.36 8.21 -71.22
External Finance Premium† 0.41 2.44 -83.20
Mortgage Interest Rate† 4.51 6.54 -31.04
* Percentage points.
†Annual, percentage points.
Table 3: Benchmark and Low-Leverage Economies: Steady-state Comparison
economy. We label this calibration as “Low-Leverage” and compare it with the benchmark,
“High-Leverage” calibration.
Table 3 reports the steady-state values of some endogenous variables in the benchmark and
the Low-Leverage economy. The last column of Table 3 reports the percentage point difference
between steady-state values in the benchmark and Low-Leverage economies. Because loans are
larger when idiosyncratic housing investment risk is lower, steady-state loans are 173 percentage
points higher in the benchmark economy, the loan-to-value ratio is 143 percentage points higher
and the leverage ratio is 34 percentage points higher. At the same time, the mortgage interest
rate and the external finance premium are considerably lower in the benchmark economy. As
a result, overall economic activity is higher in the economy with the higher leverage ratio.
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5 Credit Crunch
5.1 Benchmark Calibration
This section analyzes the dynamic response of the model to an unanticipated increase in σω,t, the
standard deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic housing investment risk. This increase
in risk wants to capture the situation in which loans are made on the basis of an expected
distribution for idiosyncratic risk, but the actual distribution turns out to be characterized by
a higher standard deviation. In other words, the riskiness of mortgages changes over time and
these changes may be persistent. More broadly, exogenous shocks to σω,t are an admittedly
reduced-form way to capture the entrance in the mortgage market of subprime, or higher risk,
debtors. Notice that an increase in σω,t has two effects on the distribution of lnωt: it increases
the variance and lowers the mean, which implies a leftward shift of the distribution. See Figure
11 in Appendix B. Since the log-normal distribution does not take negative values, a fall in the
mean implies a thicker lower tail of the distribution. Thus, for the same value of ω¯t, a higher
standard deviation implies a higher cumulative distribution function and therefore a higher
default rate on mortgages.
From the third quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2010 the delinquency rate on U.S. real
estate loans increased from 2.21 to 10.44 percentage points, an increase of 823 basis points.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of six selected variables to a 40% increase relative to its
steady state value in the standard deviation σω,t of idiosyncratic housing investment risk. The
size of the shock is chosen so as to generate an increase in the default rate of about 800 points.
The impulse responses to the same shock but of a larger set of variables are shown in Figure
6 in Appendix B. The default rate increases sharply and, together with it, the monitoring
costs. Since the mortgage contract guarantees the risk-free interest rate to aggregate loans,
the state-contingent mortgage interest rate must increase to satisfy the lenders’ participation
constraint, which implies an increase in the external finance premium paid by Borrowers. Our
model predicts a 150 basis points increase for the mortgage interest rate and the external finance
premium.
The main effects of an increase in the default rate, the monitor cost and the external finance
premium are the following. First, Borrowers’ demand for non-durable goods falls substantially.
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Because of the mortgage risk shock, Borrowers financial conditions worsen significantly. More
Borrower household members default on their loans and lose their housing stock, while non-
defaulting household members pay a higher mortgage interest rate. The overall effect on the
budget constraint of the Borrower household is large and negative because the mortgage in-
terest rate paid by non-defaulting household members rises enough to cover the increase in
monitoring costs paid by the lenders – see the participation constraint (6). In addition to this,
Borrowers experience a tightening in credit conditions due to a reduction in the loan-to-value
ratio that reduces their capacity to borrow out of their housing stock. They also experience an
increase in real debt via the Fisher effect. Worsening financial conditions force Borrowers to cut
consumption of non-durable goods, housing investment, and loans and to raise hours worked.
Savers, on the other hand, are consumption smoothers. In response to a lower real interest
rate they reduce lending, consume more non-durable goods and increase leisure. However,
Savers’ increase in consumption is small relative to the large cut by Borrowers and aggregate
consumption of non-durable goods falls.
Second, wage differentials arise in equilibrium both across sectors and across groups. Wages
in the C sector fall more relative to those in the H sector for both groups, driven by the
large fall in demand for non-durable goods. The resulting wage differential encourages partial
switching of hours by Borrowers and Savers out of the non-durable into the housing sector.
Imperfect substitutability of hours in the utility function prevents sectoral wage differential
from disappearing. Borrower wages fall more than Savers ones. As discussed above Borrowers,
who are credit constrained and considerably hurt by worsened financial conditions, are willing
to increase labor supply. As a result their wages fall in both sectors, but more in the non-durable
one. Savers, who are consumption smoothers, increase leisure in response to the decline in the
interest rate. Their labor supply drops in the non-durable sector but increases, at least on
impact, in the residential one. In fact, the wage of Savers in the H sector rises above steady
state. Savers hours are relatively scarce in the H sector and the imperfect substitutability of
labor inputs preclude firms from equalizing wages across groups.
Third, the housing sector experiences a fall in demand stemming from Borrowers’ house down-
sizing that reduces housing output, which is shown in our graphs as net of monitoring costs.
Borrowers need to replenish their housing stock and this contributes to a quick rebound in the
housing supply. In fact, housing output gross of monitoring costs (not shown in the graphs)
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increases following the shock. The relative price of houses falls on impact and subsequently
rises above steady state. This behavior of the real house price is driven by the dynamics of
the real marginal cost in the housing sector, which is an average of Borrowers (Wage B H) and
Savers (Wage S H) wages in that sector.
Finally, total output in the economy falls, independently of whether housing output is mea-
sured net or gross of monitoring costs.12 The non-durable sector represents more than 90% of
the economy and its dynamics drives that of total output.
Our model generates a 1.2 percentage points fall in total output from steady state and a small,
short-lived reduction in real housing prices following an increase in mortgage risk. Our model
underpredicts the decline in GDP and the real housing price observed in the data over the
recent recession. The rapid rebound in housing demand due to the replacement of monitoring
costs seems particularly counterfactual. We speculate that adding a housing rental market may
improve the fit of our model. We also believe that the credit crunch that followed the liquidity
crisis played a quantitatively important role in the recession of 2008-09. Our model, however,
has no capital and therefore no financial intermediation in providing capital to firms. Modeling
the financial sector and a financial accelerator in loans to firms are indeed interesting extensions
of this framework. Nevertheless, our model captures well the transmission of shocks across
sectors, as the non-durable sector is significantly affected by a risk shock in the durable one.
Indeed, the impulse responses of our model (Figure 2) match, at least qualitatively, those of the
VAR (Figure 1).13 As predicted by the model, real consumption, inflation and the nominal short
term interest rate fall in response to an innovation in serious delinquencies. Interestingly, the
model replicates well the hump-shaped response of real house price and residential investment
to an innovation to delinquencies displayed in the VAR.
5.2 Low-Leverage Calibration
Next we analyze how differences in steady-state leverage ratios imply different dynamic re-
sponses to a housing investment risk shock. Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of six selected
variables to a 40% increase relative to its steady state value in σω,t for the Low-Leverage econ-
12For consistency, our graphs report total output net of monitoring costs.
13The VAR evidence is relative to a one standard deviation innovation in σω while the data reported above
is relative to a 40% increase in σω. The difference between the decline in output and house prices in the data
and in the VAR evidence may be due to the fact that our sample for the VAR excludes the financial crisis.
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omy (red line with diamonds) and for the benchmark economy (blue starred line). Figure 7
in Appendix B plots the responses of a larger set of variables. The effects of an increase in
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk in housing investment are amplified in the highly-
leveraged benchmark economy, which is the economy with the lower steady-state standard
deviation and default rate. In particular, the credit crunch is deeper and the adverse effects on
Borrowers stronger. Loans fall more in the benchmark economy, even though the increase in
the standard deviation is actually larger in the low-leverage economy. As a result, Borrowers
must cut loans, housing demand and consumption of non-durable goods more in the economy
with high leverage; as a result, aggregate consumption and prices of non-durable goods fall
more in the high-leverage economy. The deeper contraction in non-durable demand generates
a deeper reduction in total output.
5.3 The Importance of Interest Rate Flexibility
Our benchmark calibration features a large inertia term in the interest rate rule. Here we
analyze the implications of adopting less inertial interest rate rules.14 Figure 4 shows the
impulse responses of six selected variables to a 40% increase relative to its steady state value in
the standard deviation σω,t, the same shock analyzed in the previous sections, under alternative
values for the inertial term in the interest rate rule. The starred blue line is the benchmark
specification where φr = 0.9; the red line with diamonds features no interest-rate smoothing,
φr = 0. For all specifications we keep the coefficient on inflation constant and equal to φpi = 1.5.
Figure 8 in Appendix B reports the responses of a larger set of variables.
The negative contemporaneous response of the nominal interest rate is dampened down under
the inertial interest rate rule. While the interest rate falls less than 60 basis points when
φr = 0.9, it falls more than 300 basis points when φr = 0. The different response of the
nominal interest rate has important implications for non-durable consumption. Under the
inertial interest rate rule, Borrowers cut their non-durable goods consumption more and Savers
increase it by less, thereby making the negative response of aggregate consumption stronger.
Since the nominal interest rate falls less under the inertial rule, Borrowers experience a smaller
reduction in their interest rate payments and a larger increase in real debt via the Fisher effect.
14The previous version of this paper also considered interest rate rules that respond to output. Since the
differences are small, we dropped the analysis of the response to output in the current version.
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This makes them reduce non-durable consumption and raise hours worked more, especially in
the construction sector. As a result, output in the non-durable sector as well as total output
display a deeper contraction under the inertial interest rate rule. Because Borrowers supply
more hours in the housing sector when φr is high, wages in the housing sector fall more and
housing prices are more depressed. Interestingly, housing demand, the default rate, monitoring
costs, the external finance premium, the loan-to-value ratio and loans display almost identical
responses under different degree of interest rate smoothing.
Interest rate rules featuring no inertia display a large degree of interest rate flexibility. The
nominal interest rate is cut aggressively in response to an increase in housing investment risk so
that the recession in the non-durable sector and in the economy is significantly softened. Notice
that strong inertial rules mimic a zero bound scenario where interest rate cannot be lowered
further and the negative effects of a risk shock are amplified.
6 Monetary Policy
6.1 Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 5 illustrates the impulse responses of the model under the benchmark calibration in
response to a monetary shock, namely a 25 basis point increase in the nominal interest rate
RL,t. Figure 9 in Appendix B displays the response of a larger set of variables. Savers, who
are consumption smoothers, reduce consumption of non-durable goods in response to higher
interest rates. Borrowers are adversely affected in two ways. First, they experience an increase
in the cost of borrowing. Second, deflation in non-durable goods raises their real debt via the
Fisher effect. As a result, Borrowers reduce mortgage loans, consumption of non-durable goods
and housing services. Borrowers also raise internal funds by increasing their labor supply in the
housing sector, which depresses real wages in the housing sector and thereby the relative price
of houses. As real housing prices fall, more Borrower household members default. Technically,
ω¯t+1, the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock below which household members do not
repay their mortgages, goes up and with it the default rate and monitoring costs. Since fewer
Borrower household members repay their loans, the state-contingent mortgage interest rate
rises on impact. The nominal interest rate RL,t, which is the risk-free rate guaranteed to Savers
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on outstanding mortgages to be repaid at time t, was set at time t − 1 and cannot change
on impact. As a result the external financial premium jumps up on impact. The mortgage
interest rate increases more than the nominal interest rate and the external finance premium
rises above steady state. The negative wealth effect stemming from higher default, higher
mortgage rates and lower housing value makes Borrowers further cut their consumption of
non-durable goods. Aggregate consumption and production of non-durable goods fall. The
fall in relative housing prices raises housing demand by Savers, who substitute out of loans
into housing. Monitoring costs reduce the existing stock of housing, thereby raising housing
demand. As a result, production in the housing sector increases slightly. Nevertheless the
expansion in the construction sector is small and the contraction in the non-durable sector
more than compensates it, so that total output falls.
A monetary policy shock causes changes of output of opposite sign in the two sectors, along the
lines of Barsky et al. (2007). In their model a monetary shock that brings down the non-durable
sticky-price sector generates an offsetting response in the durable flexible-price sector and GDP
is left unchanged, independently of the relative size of the durable good sector. Our model
shares some features with that of Barsky et al. (2007), in particular a durable flexible-price
sector and a non-durable sticky-price one. The response of our model to a monetary shock
displays some similarities to that of Barsky et al. (2007). Nevertheless, in our model total
output and GDP fall,15 independently of whether we measure output in the durable sector
net or gross of monitoring costs. Due to imperfect substitutability both on the supply and
demand side, labor does not move across sectors so as to close wage differentials. In addition
to that, Borrowers in our model are constrained and fail to behave as consumption smoothers.
In particular, Borrower housing demand is driven by the fact that housing can be used as
collateral for borrowing, which makes the shadow value of housing different between Savers and
Borrowers.
The result that sectoral output moves in opposite directions in response to a monetary policy
shock is at odd with the empirical evidence. Our VAR impulse responses plotted in Figure 1
exhibit positive co-movement between consumption and residential investment, confirming the
findings of Barsky et al. (2007) and Erceg and Levin (2006). There are two ways to reconcile
15We do not report GDP measured as total output at steady-state relative prices. Nevertheless, GDP would
fall in our model.
34
our model results with this empirical evidence.
The first is to allow for price stickiness in the housing sector. Figure 10 plots the impulse
responses of our model for a large set of variables to a 25 basis points increase in the nominal
interest rate under different calibrations. The starred blue line is the benchmark calibration,
where prices in the housing sector are flexible (θH = 0). The red line with diamonds is the
specification with sticky prices in the housing sector (θH = 0.67). The light blue line with
triangles assumes price stickiness in the housing sector (θH = 0.67), perfect substitutability of
hours (ς = 100 and ξ = 0) and a non-inertial monetary policy rule (φr = 0, ρm = 0.5). For all
specifications we keep the degree of price stickiness in the non-durable sector constant and equal
to θC = 0.67. Under price stickiness in housing prices (red line), residential investment falls on
impact.16 When firms in the durable sector cannot fully adjust prices, labor demand contracts
more and wages of Borrowers and Savers in that sector fall more relative to the case with flexible
housing prices. The drop in labor income together with the decrease in the nominal interest rate
induce Savers to cut the supply of loans. Borrowers must therefore reduce their loans too and
the value of housing as collateral decreases. Thus, the negative income effect stemming from the
larger reduction in Borrowers wage in the H sector translates into a sharper fall in Borrowers
housing demand. This demand contraction explains the decline in output in the H sector.
After the first period, however, residential output rises above steady state. This quick rebound
is due to both the imperfect substitutability of hours and the highly inertial response of the
nominal interest rate. Once we relax these assumptions, the recovery of residential investment
is much slower (see the light blue line with triangles). Higher substitutability of labor supplies
and an aggressive reaction of the nominal interest dampen the wage contraction and the initial
drop in housing demand, thereby smoothing the behavior of housing investment.
Another way to achieve output co-movement in our model is to allow for wage stickiness in
both sectors, as suggested by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006). Wages respond less to a monetary
shock in the presence of nominal wage stickiness. As a result, firms face a higher marginal cost
and contract more the supply of new houses. This fall in the housing supply may more than
compensate the increase in Borrowers housing demand stemming from monitoring costs that
16For simplicity we report only the cases of θH = 0 and θH = 0.67. Yet, according to our simulations, housing
output falls on impact for much lower degrees of stickiness, i.e. for θH as low as 0.16. This result is consistent
with the findings of Monacelli (2009).
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drives the growth of residential output in our simulations. Whether housing output falls or
rises is going to depend on the behavior of relative house prices. We leave the introduction of
wage stickiness to future research.
7 Conclusions
This paper introduces endogenous default on mortgages in a DGSE model with housing. It
analyzes the dynamic response to an increase in the volatility of the distribution of idiosyncratic
housing investment risk. We calibrate the size of the shock so as to generate an increase in
the default rate of the same magnitude as seen in the data. Under the benchmark calibration,
which features a inertial interest rate rule that mimics the zero lower bound, our model predicts
a fall in output in both the durable and the non-durable sector. In our model real GDP per
capita falls below steady state by 1.3 percentage points and the housing sector by 3.5 percentage
points. In the data, U.S. real GDP per capita fell three percentage points below trend in the
third quarter of 2009 and residential investment almost seventeen percentage points. Our model
predicts a small reduction in real housing prices followed by a quick rebound. In the data, U.S.
real house prices have been below baseline since 2008Q1 and were 7.3 percentage points below
trend at their trough in 2009Q1. The calibration without inertial monetary policy predicts
even smaller output reductions, while the relative price of housing increases on impact and falls
below steady state after 5 quarters after the shock. We speculate that some features of our
model are responsible for under-predicting the drop in housing investment and house prices.
We discuss them below.
If we measure output in the housing sector gross of monitoring costs, the housing sector
expands following an increase in mortgage risk. This happens because monitoring costs cause
a reduction in Borrowers’ housing stock that they want to replenish rapidly. Housing serves
as collateral for Borrowers and housing services enter the utility function directly. It is not
surprising that, following a sharp increase in the rate of default on mortgages and sizable losses
in their housing stock, Borrowers seek to quickly rebuild their housing stock, thereby sharply
raising housing demand. This result is due to our assumption that the monitoring cost is a
fraction of the housing stock whose mortgage has been defaulted on. In reality, foreclosure does
not cause a reduction of the housing stock but it represents a loss of revenues by lenders. An
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assumption closer to reality could model monitoring costs in terms of loans. A model featuring
a rental market may also help reducing the strong and counterfactual surge in housing demand
by Borrowers, who can get housing services by renting rather than buying houses. In our model,
however, Borrowers demand housing not only because it provides services but also because it
can be used as collateral. Even though a rental market provides access to housing services
without the need to own a house, it is unlikely it will completely eliminate the increase in
Borrowers’ housing demand.
Our model predicts a rapid rebound in the construction sector following a large increase in
mortgage delinquencies. This is not surprising, as housing prices are perfectly flexible and the
only friction in our housing sector is imperfect substitutability of labor types. Introducing
lags in production or capital and investment adjustment costs in the construction sector would
contribute to generate smoother output responses.
In standard DSGE models with non-durable sticky prices and durable flexible prices, a distur-
bance that generates a recession in the non-durable sector causes an expansion in the durable
sector that leaves GDP unchanged. While our model is non-standard in a number of ways, our
housing sector displays some tendency to move in the opposite direction of the non-durable
sector, for example in response to a monetary policy shock. The VAR evidence at the begin-
ning of the paper shows that the durable and housing sectors co-move following a mortgage risk
shock and a monetary shock. Imperfect substitutability of hours in the two sectors brings more
sectorial co-movement, as it allows for wage differentials that mitigate the incentive of labor to
leave the sector with falling wages to enter the booming sector with rising wages. In fact, an
earlier version of our model that did not feature imperfect substitutability of hours displayed
a large positive response of the housing sector to an increase in mortgage risk, irrespective
of whether output in the sector was measured net or gross of monitoring costs. We speculate,
however, that wage stickiness may play an important role in bringing the model closer to reality
and dampening out the output response in the H sector.
Our model features financial intermediation and a financial accelerator only for the purpose
of housing investment. There is no capital in our simple model and therefore no financial
intermediation for providing capital to firms. We believe however that a decline in financial
intermediation has been a crucial contributor to the Great Recession. In particular, the credit
crunch, i.e. the tightening of lending conditions faced by firms, that followed the liquidity crisis
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reduced economic activity and further amplified the effects of the sub-prime crisis. Introducing
a formal banking sector and financial intermediation to provide capital to firms may help to
amplify the output effects of financial shocks like the housing investment risk shock considered
here.
The mortgage contract in our model is a one-period adjustable rate mortgage contract.
Lenders do not take any risk, as they are guaranteed the risk-free rate on the total amount
of loans they give out to Borrowers. In reality mortgage contracts are more complex than the
contract considered here. In particular, fixed-rate multi-year contracts and ARM contracts
with nonstandard features may have played a role in setting up the crisis and making it more
persistent. At the same time, our mortgage contract is nonrecourse, as the borrower is not
personally liable and the lender’s recovery is limited to the collateral. Most U.S. states feature
non-judicial foreclosure and our assumption describes well this situation. In other states and
countries, however, borrowers may be liable for part of the difference between the value of the
loan and that of the collateral, as lenders could pursue borrowers’ additional assets or require
income payments proportional or equal to such difference. The contract featured in our model
does not account for these alternative legal arrangements. It could however include income
payments in addition to the loss of the housing stock. Modeling the possibility to pursue de-
faulting borrowers’ assets in addition to their houses requires the introduction of an asset that
borrowers hold in equilibrium. We leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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A Data and Sources
CC : Aggregate Consumption. Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally adjusted,
billions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional
Population (CNP16OV, source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).
IH : Residential Investment. Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjusted,
billions of chained 2005 dollars, Table 1.1.6.), divided by CNP16OV. Source: BEA.
INFLY : Inflation. Percentage change from year ago in the implicit price deflator for the
nonfarm business sector. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
RRY : Nominal Short-term Interest Rate. 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market
Rate), expressed in yearly units. (Series ID: H15/RIFSGFSM03 NM). Source: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
QQ : Real House Prices. Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold
including value of lot) deflated with the implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business
sector. Source: Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/const/price sold cust.xls.
DEL : Seriously delinquent mortgages, not seasonally adjusted, percentage of total mortgages.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey.
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